National Security Presidential Memorandum 33 (NSPM-33) Implementation

DOD:  The DoD Fundamental Research Decision Matrix prohibits the use of DoD funds for fundamental research conducted in collaboration with, or using equipment from, entities appearing on DoD Prohibited Entity Lists. The restriction applies not only to new purchases but also to equipment already owned and used on DoD-funded projects, requiring researchers to stop using this equipment or work with DOD to develop transition or mitigation plans. Additional research security restrictions apply to collaborations (even co-authorship) with Prohibited Entities, foreign funding from countries of concern, and participation in malign foreign talent recruitment programs.

NSF:  NSF announced on July 8, 2026, its intent to implement in Fiscal Year 2027 a new policy prohibiting (1) use of NSF funds on collaborations with entities on certain U.S. restricted parties lists, lists, and (2) senior/key personnel on NSF-funded projects from holding an appointment or position with, or receiving research support from, these restricted entities for the duration of their NSF award. Although the policy is scheduled for full implementation in FY2027, NSF has already begun incorporating these restrictions into certain award and proposal review processes.

Other Agencies: While other major federal research funding agencies, such as NSF, NIH, DOE, and USDA have implemented similar risk review processes and/or rely on U.S. restricted party lists (including the 1260H list) to assess international affiliations and collaborations, they have not yet imposed prohibitions—like those of the DoD—on the use of equipment from listed entities.

However, the BIOSECURE Act, enacted on December 18, 2025, does broadly restrict procurement involving biotechnology products or services over the course of several years. While not effective in the immediate-term, under this Act, federal agencies and entities that receive federal funds cannot “procure or obtain any biotechnology equipment or service produced or provided by a biotechnology company of concern,” (BCC) and agencies and grantees are also prohibited from entering, extending, or renewing a contract with an entity that uses equipment or services provided by a BCC. 

Entities are automatically designated as a BCC through inclusion on the 1260H list. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget has been directed to determine which additional entities should be classified as BCCs by December 18, 2026, and to publish a list annually. The prohibition is anticipated to become effective in Summer/Fall 2028. What is not known is whether individual federal agencies will, like DoD, implement their own prohibitions on equipment from 1260H listed entities in advance of BIOSECURE Act implementation.

Additionally, NIH issued a reminder notice on May 27, 2026, regarding its “longstanding definition” of a foreign component.  Here is a brief summary as taken from COGR: NIH stated that it has not expanded this definition. Yet, institutions have noted that certain NIH institutes and centers are flagging any foreign coauthor on a NIH-supported publication as evidence of a foreign component, without fully evaluating whether the underlying scientific relationship constitutes the performance of “a significant scientific element or segment of an NIH-funded project performed outside of the United States.”  NIH noted that while most instances of foreign co-authorship represent a foreign component, in some cases coauthorships may result from minor or indirect contributions that do not constitute an actual scientific collaboration and in other cases, the underlying research collaboration was actually carried out while the co-author was in the United States.   Several federal agencies (e.g., DoD and DOE) have also incorporated publication relationships and co-authorship into broader research security review frameworks, using such information as one factor among many when assessing the nature and extent of foreign engagement associated with federally funded research.

1. Disclosure expectations increasingly extend beyond traditional notions of scientific collaboration. NIH’s Reminder reflects a growing federal interest in obtaining visibility into a broad range of foreign relationships, affiliations, activities, and publication-related connections. In some circumstances, agencies may seek disclosure and review of foreign engagements even when the underlying activity does not involve substantive intellectual collaboration, a shared research effort, or a significant transfer of knowledge.  At the same time, coauthorship is increasingly considered a factor in agency research security risk assessment frameworks, where publication relationships are evaluated alongside foreign affiliations.
2. Increased attention to the Stevens Amendment. The Stevens Amendment (Section 511 of Public Law 101-166) is an appropriations provision that requires grantees of the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services and the Department of Education to clearly identify the percentage and dollar amount of federal funding supporting a project in publicly disseminated materials describing program accomplishments.   NIH’s Grants Policy Statement implements the Stevens Amendment by requiring recipients of HHS funding to acknowledge federal support in statements, press releases, requests for proposals, bid invitations, and other documents describing projects or programs funded in whole or in part with federal funds. Specifically, recipients must disclose (1) the percentage and dollar amount of the total project or program costs financed with federal funding, and (2) for programs requiring cost sharing, the dollar amount of total project costs financed by nongovernmental sources. Why this matters: While historically enforcement of the requirement has been focused on bringing recipients into compliance rather than imposing severe sanctions, noncompliance with the Stevens Amendment can be treated as a breach of award responsibilities that could ultimately lead to suspension, termination, or debarment remedies available under broader federal grant authorities.  It could also, potentially, form the basis for False Claims Act enforcement efforts.  Institutions should consider educating faculty on the requirements of the Stevens Amendment as part of larger communication efforts regarding responsible and ethical authorship and citation practices.  

• DOD: Researchers who have or expect to apply for DoD funding must immediately identify and cease any collaborations with, or use of equipment from, entities on DoD Prohibited Entity Lists in DoD-funded projects. Additionally, do not make any new purchases from, or enter into any new collaborations with, any of those entities. Of the current 13 prohibited lists the three main ones include the DoD1260H List,  DoD1286 List and BIS Entity List. Review the FAQs below for guidance on how to determine if an entity (company, university, or individual) is on a prohibited list.
  • In addition, researchers who currently have or are anticipating DoD funding must immediately cease using the Anthropic AI platform (i.e. Claude).
• NSF: Researchers who have or expect to apply for NSF funding should review the Dear Colleague Letter and their collaborations for relationships with entities on the U.S. restricted parties lists. Although the policy is scheduled for full implementation in FY2027, NSF has already begun incorporating these restrictions into certain award and proposal review processes. 
• The BIOSECURE Act, enacted on December 18, 2025, will phase restrictions that prevent federal funding recipients from using biotechnology equipment or services from “biotechnology companies of concern” in the performance of federal contracts or grants.
• Other federal funding: Researchers who have or expect to apply for other federal funding should plan ahead by reviewing and identifying alternatives to equipment, services, software, and collaborations from or with entities on DoD Prohibited Entity Lists. and other U.S. restricted parties lists, particularly biotechnology equipment and services ahead of implementation of the BIOSECURE Act. 
• Non-federally funded activities: Procurement of equipment or services from restricted parties may be considered if no viable or cost-effective alternative exists. Discuss these purchases in advance with your college/department leadership, Procurement, and the RCIS Office. However, equipment and services from restricted entities should not be purchased for use in spaces where federally funded research may take place, such as core facilities, recharge centers, and other shared facilities and resources on campus.

*See FAQs below for guidance on how to determine if an entity is on a prohibited list.

• Review outside activities for terms consistent with a malign foreign talent recruitment program or related activity. If you are unsure whether a potential activity qualifies, contact the UNL RCIS Office.
• Ensure you have approval from your federal sponsor prior to including a foreign collaborator or co-author (or being added as one yourself).
• Provide full and accurate disclosures in all required documents (e.g., biosketch, Other Support, proposal disclosures, and project updates). This includes but is not limited to:
  • Appointments or affiliations (paid, unpaid, visiting, honorary)
  • Funding or in‑kind support (research, travel, materials, equipment)
  • Patent filings, invention disclosures, and IP agreements
  • International collaborators and co-authors
  • Any current or past involvement with talent recruitment programs
  • Carefully vet current or planned collaborators and co‑authors, especially in science and engineering fields and particularly if individuals are affiliated with a Foreign Country of Concern.
  • Request restricted party screenings through the UNL RCIS Office. RICS can verify whether any collaborators, co‑authors, institutions, or companies are on any prohibited lists.
  • For any U.S. government–funded research: Do not file patent applications in foreign jurisdictions before filing in the United States. Ensure all related IP activity is fully disclosed to the university and in sponsor documentation.
  • For DoD funded work, ensure that any equipment you plan to use is not sourced from an entity on a Prohibited Entity List. Again, the RCIS Office can help confirm equipment providers are not restricted parties.
  • Ask questions early and often. If something is unclear—or if you think an issue might be a concern—contact the RCIS office for guidance.
  • Reach out to the RCIS office to conduct restricted party screening when considering a new collaboration or when a current or intended collaborator or co-author is leaving the U.S. for a foreign institution

Certain federal sponsors now require that any collaborator and/or equipment research personnel plan to work with does not involve or is not sourced from or manufactured by an entity listed on a Prohibited Entity List. Because multiple such lists exist, the University of Nebraska subscribes to a third-party tool, Visual Compliance, that consolidates and maintains up-to-date versions of these lists. As the lists change over time, the most effective way to remain compliant is to use the Visual Compliance screening tool to conduct restricted party screenings. Your campus’s Export Control Office can assist with restricted party screenings upon request.

exportcontrol@unl.edu

Ideally, yes. We recognize that screening every purchase is not always feasible. Researchers are advised to focus screening efforts on items associated with critical or sensitive technologies and higher‑risk purchases rather than low‑risk, routine items such as common laboratory or office supplies that are readily available through standard commercial vendors.

No, not all purchases are automatically screened. Purchases processed through the University of Nebraska’s Procurement vendor system are automatically screened. However, purchases made using a P-card (procurement card) are not automatically screened. If you are using a P-card, you are responsible for ensuring that appropriate screening is completed.

Ideally, all DoD and NSF funded purchases should be screened. Screening should be prioritized for higher‑risk equipment and technologies, particularly those that may be relevant to export controls, national security concerns, or specialized equipment or computing software. Routine, low‑risk items (general lab equipment) may not require the same level of review.

Yes. The DoD and NSF emphasized the importance of avoiding purchases from entities on the DoD1260H List and the DoD1286 List. When feasible, higher‑risk purchases should be screened against all applicable restricted or prohibited party or entity lists, consistent with University policy and federal requirements of not purchasing or using equipment from Prohibited Entities or parties. 

Possibly, DoD and NSF have not been specific on this portion. We recommend that you please flag any past purchases from Prohibited Entities and do not use them. Notify the Export Control Office for your campus if you identify any impacted equipment or services and they will assist with next steps in coordination with the PI and your department of college leadership. We are also researching past purchases and agreements through Procurement and Sponsored Research.             

Each federal agency’s guidance, awards and agreements differ, and you need to ensure that you follow the terms and conditions. Some of the restrictions include but are not limited to the following:

• BIOSECURE ACT: Section 851 of the NDAA.
• Prohibition on Contracting for Hardware, Software, and Services Developed or Provided by Kaspersky Lab Covered Entities FAR 52.204-23
• Prohibition on Contracting for Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment FAR 52.204-25
• Prohibition on Unmanned Aircraft Systems Manufactured or Assembled by American Security Drone Act-Covered Foreign Entities FAR 52.240-1 Reference this resource related to Drone purchases.
• National Security and Unallowable Costs – USDA Terms and Conditions though we expect other agencies have or will adopt similar terms

We have issued many other related guidance documents over the last several months/years. Please see the below for additional resources, particularly for screening collaborators to ensure you are not collaborating with a restricted or prohibited party.

• NSPM-33 and Federal Agency Risk Assessments
• Restricted Party Screening
• Foreign Influence & International Activities
• Research Data & Security Required Training
• Transparency in Research-Federal Agency Biosketch/Other Support Disclosure Requirements